This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargaining games with stochastic outcome and disagreement points. When absolute risk tolerance is linear with constant slope, the Nash's solution to bargaining with risky outcomes and risky disagreement points can be viewed as division of divisible certainty equivalent between two risk-averse agents. We show that whether a deterioration of a bargainer's risky prospect is advantageous to his opponent often depends on whether preference displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Speci…cally, for perfectly correlated risky prospects, DARA à la Arrow-Pratt works to the concavity of the joint certainty equivalent with respect to a bargainer's initial wealth or size of risky exposure; for independent risky prospects, DARA à la Ross vulnerates his risk bearing under Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk taking the form of adding an independent noise, both leading to the bargainer's increased propensity for risk aversion as well as the joint size of the pie. These results illuminate how individual risky prospect as well as risk preference in ‡uence the cooperating partners'income shares and thus the market equilibrum of marriage formation.
Introduction
There is emerging consensus that e¢ cient risk sharing across larger units is rejected (Townsend, 1994) Other circumstances …t into this picture include joint venture agreements. As stock turns a less attractive commodity and merger and acquisition deals declines, strategic alliances and joint ventures are becoming increasingly popular as reduced sites of uncertainty. In joint ventures, two or more "parents" from related business or geographic markets agree to share resources to create a new entity which is jointly operated for mutual bene…t. The amount of control exerted over the new entity typically depends on the parents'relative bargaining strengths as well as their risk preferences and pre-existing risky projects.
A frequently cited proposition in the bargaining literature asserts that an increase in one's degree of risk aversion improves the position of one's opponent. Intuitively, the subjective possibility of strategically reaching disagreement and its costly consequence makes risk aversion disadvantageous in bargaining, except in situations in which every potential agreement has a positive probability of yielding to one of the bargainers an outcome worse than disagreements (Kannai, 1977; Roth, 1977 Roth, , 1978 Roth, , 1979 Roth, , 1985 Roth, , 1985b Roth, , 1989 Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler, 1981; Roth and Rothblum, 1982; Sobel, 1981; Riddell, 1981; Safra, Zhou and Zilcha, 1990 ). The connection of attributes of risky prospect to bargaining is less examined. Conven-tional wisdom suggests that deterioration of a bargainer's income decreases his share of the pie, however, risk aversion is not su¢ cient to guarantee an increase in his opponent's …nal payo¤. The e¤ect of a bargainer's initial wealth and risky exposure on risk-sharing agreements is typically correlated with higher-order properties of utility function. The purpose of this paper is to examine the comparative statics regarding changes in initial wealth and changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargaining games with stochastic outcomes and disagreement points.
We show that if absolute risk tolerance is linear with constant slope, the Nash's solution to bargaining with risky outcomes and risky disagreement points can be viewed as division of certainty equivalent between two risk-averse agents. A sure reduction in a bargainer's income inevitably lowers his payo¤ (in the certainty-equivalent space) which, under DARA, serves to increase his risk aversion. In addition, for perfectly correlated risky prospects, DARA à la Arrow-Pratt (Arrow, 1971) works to the concavity of net certainty equivalent with respect to the bargainer's initial wealth or size of risky exposure; for independent risky prospects, DARA à la Ross (1981) vulnerates his risk-bearing under independent Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) marginal increase in risk. The above results guarantees an increase in his opponent's bargaining strength associated with risk aversion as well as the joint size of the pie, and ultimately the opponent's payo¤. The analysis performed in this paper illuminates how important individual risky prospect as well as risk preference in ‡uence the cooperating entities' income shares. The predicted outcome can be used to examine the market equilibrium of partnership formation, in which the agents will commit to rules for insurance prior to the realization of the state of nature. This paper is part of the game-theoretic literature on the comparative statics regarding uncertainty on the outcome of bargaining. In Nash's (1950) axiomatic single period bargaining model concerning the distribution of a divisible commodity between two risk-averse agents, Kannai (1977) showed that the payo¤ which Nash's solution assigns to a bargainer increases as his opponent becomes more risk averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. Roth (1977) and Thomson (1980) independently generalized the notion of Shapley value to certainty-equivalent of strategically risk-neutral agents participating in a bargaining process where there is subjective probability in reaching agreement at certain outcomes. Roth (1978) and Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1981) considered the bargaining situation of selecting an outcome from a set of riskless outcomes in the models of Nash (1950) , Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Perles and Maschler (1981) . Sobel (1981) elaborated the results to bargaining over the distribution of several divisible commodities. In a strategic multiperiod bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) , Roth (1985) showed that risk aversion within each period has the same e¤ect on the predicted outcome of bargaining. All the above results con…rm risk aversion to be disadvantageous in bargaining whose potential outcomes involve no probabilistic risk. Roth and Rothblum (1982) have dealt with the case in which bargaining is over risky outcome and riskless disagreement. They found that risk aversion is disadvantageous except in situations where disagreement outcome is preferred to potential agreement by one of the bargainers with positive probability. Safra, Zhou and Zilcha (1990) included risky disagreement points and impose further restriction on the degree of change in risk aversion for the result to hold. Instead of risk posture, Riddell (1981) examined the comparative statics e¤ects of increase in uncertainty on several bargaining solutions. In a situation where changes in uncertainty only concern with changes in the probability of the state of the world (and thus both bargainers' disagreement points), he found changes in uncertainty irrelevant to the outcomes of bargaining. The current paper is one of the …rst attempts to analyze the in ‡uence of individual asset position and Rothschild-Stiglitz change in risk on the predicted bargaining outcome. We conduct our analysis in a single period Nash bargaining model concerning the division of the pooled income from two risky prospects. We then check the robustness of our results under Rubinstein's alternating-o¤er bargaining game.
The predictions regarding changes in risk on the bargaining outcomes are important, because they connect the theory of bargaining with the most important hypotheses regarding decision making under multiple sources of risks. In a multiplicative model where individuals'pre-existing risks are perfectly correlated, pooling multiple risks are self-aggravating in the sense that joint risk premium is a convex function of the joint size of the risks (Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 2001 ). In an additive model where individuals' pre-existing risks are independent, risk vulnerability guarantees that adding an exogenous unfair background risk raises risk aversion with respect to any other independent risk (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) . The current paper shows that when absolute risk tolerance is increasing and linear with constant slope, the shape of the monetary value for the pooled risky prospects with respect to initial wealth or joint size of risks and the concepts of risk vulnerability are central to the explanation of the predicted bargaining outcome.
A recent paper by White (2008) studies how the existence of risk in bargaining agreements a¤ects the outcome of negotiations in Rubinstein's alternating-o¤er bargaining game. Surprisingly, she …nds that under reasonable conditions, a risk averse bargainer increases his bargaining power and thereby gets a larger share of the pie when the agreement is riskier. The bargaining power can even be increased so much that he becomes strictly better o¤. There are two key di¤erences between her paper and ours. First, the risk that she considers only emerges when agreement is reached.
In the case of disagreement, agents receive riskless outside options. In our paper, the risk under concern is not from the agreement. Each agent's individual risk is the same no matter whether agreement is reached. Secondlly, she does not consider e¢ -cient risk sharing between the two bargainers: all the risks following the agreement are born by the bargainers separately. We suggest that once the barrier to e¢ cient risk sharing is removed, her results might be reversed.
The paper is organized as follows. The bargaining game is presented in Section 2.
We show that if absolute risk tolerance is linear with constant slope, Nash's solution to bargaining with risky outcomes and risky disagreement points can be viewed as division of certainty equivalent between two risk-averse agents. We then give an example where a bargainer may be hurt by an increase of his opponent's risk when no further restriction is imposed other than risk aversion. Section 3 examined the situation where individuals'risks are perfectly correlated. Our result argues that under DARA deterioration of risk is advantageous to one's opponent. We derive stronger restrictions on utility function in Section 4 where individuals'risks are independent.
In section 5, we apply the results in a simple market game of marriage formation. In section 6, we check the robustness of the result with the Rubinstein bargaining solution and with the case where there is cooperation bene…t from synergy. We conclude in Section 7.
The Nash Bargaining Game
Consider a potential partnership where two agents endowed with random prospects The bargaining game is de…ned by a pair (S; d) where
Y g is the set of (unanimously agreed) feasible expected utility payo¤s to the agents, d = (Eu(ỹ 1 ); Eu(ỹ 2 )) 2 S is the disagreement points, and s(Y )
is the risk sharing rule that maps each realized value ofỸ to agent 1's individual share. Nash's solution will specify risk-sharing rulesŝ(Y ) which solves the following
and yields the bargaining outcomes
to agent 1 and 2 respectively. Now assume agent 2's random prospect su¤ers a deterioration: a sure reduction or an increase in risk. Throughout the paper, we use the superscript "*" to denote the corresponding variables after the deterioration. Letỹ 2 denote agent 2's random prospect after the deterioration, and the new bargaining model is (S ; d ),
. We assume this deterioration does not a¤ect the cooperation bene…t from synergy B. The question that is central to the present paper is: will agent 1 be better o¤ under the new bargaining game (S ; d )?
Problem P1 concerning risk-sharing rules is not easy to solve. However, it is well known that if absolute risk tolerance is linear, the Pareto frontier in the monetaryequivalent space is a straight line and the monetary value of the joint pie is distributional free, i.e., the sum of two agents' certainty equivalent is constant for any e¢ cient risk sharing rule and does not depend on the weights given to the agents (see Appendix for a proof). Thus the Nash's solution to bargaining with risky out-comes and risky disagreement points can be viewed as division of a …xed amount of certainty equivalent between two risk-averse agents.
Denote C as the total certainty equivalent bargained over by two agents, C 1 , C 2 as their respective share, and
) as their disagreement payo¤s in monetary terms. Since C is free of weights, we might as well adopt the half-half division 1 , i.e., each spouse will take care of half of the pooled
. By de…nition u(
and thus C = 2u 1 Eu
The net surplus in terms of certainty equivalent is N C = C C
e¢ cient risk sharing enlarges the size of the pie shared by the two agents. In the following of this paper, whenever we say "the size of the pie", we refer to the net surplus N C.
Since Nash solution is Pareto optimal and satis…es the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, we can restrict our attention on the Pareto frontier which, under this transformation, is given by
It can be proved that there exists a unique Nash solution on S P and
3 (in the certainty-equivalent space) can be obtained from the following maximization problem (See appendix for proof):
From the constraint we have C 2 = C C 1 . Substituting it into the original maximization problem and taking the F.O.C. with respect to C 1 gives:
which, after rearranging, yields
i.e., the ratio of the marginal utilities evaluated at the certainty-equivalent bargaining outcomes equals the ratio of the net shares of the pie in terms of expected utility.
Now consider the e¤ect of replacing agent 2's risky prospect with a deteriorated one,ỹ 2 : The deterioration has two e¤ects. First, it reduces the sum of the certainty equivalent. Denote the reduced amount as C = C C . Second, it also reduces the disagreement certainty equivalent of agent 2. Denote the reduced amount as
The reduced amount of the size of the pie, i.e., the net surplus, is
When N C > 0, the size of the pie decreases after the deterioration; when N C < 0, the size of the pie increases after the deterioration.
The expected utility which Nash's solution assigns to agent 1 increases as agent 2's project becomes more risky if
which, by using the expression of C and C d 2 and noticing that C = C 1 + C 2 ; rewrites as:
Rearranging the above inequality writes:
where
Notice that when the size of the pie does not change, i.e., C = C 
. Substituting into the expression of ( C), we get
is increasing in C. Denote A(w) = u 00 (w)=u 0 (w) as the absolute risk aversion. We have
which is positive if A is decreasing, and negative if A is increasing.
The above Lemma states that, a deterioration in agent 2's risky prospect, if it doesn't a¤ect the net bargaining surplus, i.e., C = C Disagreement has costly consequences and the desire to avoid the risk of disagreement is re ‡ected in the …nal bargaining outcome. A more risk-averse agent has a stronger desire to avoid such risk hence is willing to give up more share during the bargaining, in order to facilitate reaching an agreement. Lemma 1 immediately gives the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If preference exhibits DARA and C C
The above proposition gives a su¢ cient condition for a bargainer's deterioration of risky prospect to be advantageous or disadvantageous to his opponent. An agent bene…ts from a deterioration of his opponent's risky prospect if preference exhibits DARA and the net bargaining surplus increases; in contrast, he su¤ers if preference exhibits IARA and the net bargaining surplus decreases. We conclude this section with an example showing that DARA alone is not su¢ cient for the prediction that a bargainer's deterioration of risky prospect to be advantageous to his opponent to hold.
Example 1 Suppose agent 1 is endowed with a risky projectỹ 1 = w 1 +" and agent 2 a riskless project y 2 = w 2 , where" is small risk with E(") = 0 and V ar(") = 2 . Moreover, assume B = 0. We want to determine whether agent 1 is better o¤ when w 2 decreases. By applying Arrow-Pratt approximation to
we have that
2 . Denote L as the LHS of (1). We know that the usual prediction won't hold if @L @w 2 > 0, and if this is the case,
> 0, i.e., a reduction in agent 2's …xed pro…t makes agent 1 worse o¤. Indeed, noticing that C 2 = C C 1 and C d 2 = w 2 ; we have
The fourth equality uses the equality
derived from (1). The above result implies:
which is strictly positive if A is decreasing. The last equality follows because
By continuity, In the following sections, we …rst solve the problem in the case when B = 0. That is, there is no synergy and the only bene…t of cooperation is risk sharing. Then, in section 6.2, we check that all our results hold for positive B:
Perfectly Correlated Risks
The sources of uncertainty considered in this paper include systematic risk which is associated with occurrences such as war, recession, in ‡ation and ‡uctuating interest rates, and idiosyncratic shocks which only a¤ect a particular project at a time. We examine the …rst environment in this section, and the second in the next section.
Throughout this section, we assume thatỹ 1 = w 0 +";ỹ 2 = w 0 + k". E(") = 0, that is, agent's risks are perfectly correlated.
A Sure Reduction
Consider the situation whereỹ 2 is replaced byỹ 2 = w 0 0 + k". If the risk is small with V ar(") = 2 , by applying Arrow-Pratt approximation to C = 2u 1 Eu
and consequently
The …rst term is negative if A is decreasing and convex. This is indeed the case when utility belongs to the HARA class and exhibit DARA. The second term is non-positive if k 1 and A is decreasing. Following Proposition 1, we conclude that when risk is small and utility exhibits DARA, a bargainer's sure reduction in pro…t bene…ts his opponent, given that his opponent's initial risk is not too small: k 1.
Now we turn to the general case. De…ne CE (k"; w 0 ) as the certainty equivalent for k units of risk" with certain background wealth w 0 which satis…es
and related risk premium (k"; w 0 ) , Ek" CE(k"; w 0 ). The following Lemma is useful.
Lemma 2 If preference belongs to the class of HARA, then (k"; w 0 ) is convex in both k and w 0 , i.e.,
0. Moreover, the cross derivative of (k"; w 0 ) with respect to k and w 0 is negative:
Proof. Solving CE(k"; w 0 ) and therefore (k"; w 0 ) from (3) and taking second partial derivative of (k"; w 0 ) w.r.t. k, yields that
Solving from the expression of risk tolerance t(w) =
Substituting into the above inequality yields that
which holds as a direct application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The convexity of (k"; w 0 ) in w 0 follows similarly. The proof of ; w 0
(k"; w 0 0 ), we have
and
Hence,
; w 0 ) + ( ; s @w 0 ds.
The …rst term is negative if ; w 0 is increasing and convex in w 0 . The second term is negative for k > 1 if
is increasing in k. These are indeed the cases by Lemma 2. The following Proposition concludes.
Proposition 2a
If preference exhibits DARA, risks are perfectly correlated and k 1, then F 1 (S ; d ) > F 1 (S; d) when agent 2 su¤ers from a sure reduction.
An Increase in Risk
Consider the situation whereỹ 2 is replaced byỹ 2 = w 0 + k ", with k > k. When risk is small with V ar(") = 2 ; by applying Arrow-Pratt approximation, C = 2w 0 1+k 2
which is negative if k 1. From Proposition 1, DARA is su¢ cient to ensure that agent 1 betters o¤ as agent 2's risk size increases.
In general, we have
which is negative if 2 1+k 2 "; w 0 (k"; w 0 ) decreases in k. Calculation gives
which is negative since 
Independent Risks
Throughout this section, we assume thatỹ 1 = w 0 +" 1 ;ỹ 2 = w 0 +" 2 ; where E(" 1 ) = E(" 2 ) = 0 and" 1 ;" 2 are i.i.d. with support [ a; a] :
A Sure Reduction
Consider the situation whereỹ 2 is replaced byỹ 2 = w 0 0 +" 2 , that is, agent 2 su¤ers from a sure reduction. When risk is small with V ar(") = 2 ; by applying Arrow-Pratt approximation, we know that C = 2w 0 1 2
which is negative if preference satis…es DARA and positive if preference exhibits
IARA. The following Proposition concludes.
Proposition 3a If risks are small and independent, and agent 2 su¤ers from a sure reduction, then F 1 (S ; d ) > F 1 (S; d) if preference exhibits DARA, and
In general,
; w 0
From Lemma 2, we know that C < 0
; w 0 0 . We will be done if the following inequality holds
By the assumption that" 1 and" 2 are i.i.d., " 2
is a RothschildStiglitz increase in risk with respect to"
Hence (8) can be interpreted as: the increased cost of risk associated with a sure reduction in wealth is smaller for less risky asset. Alternatively, one can also interprete equation (8) as the monetary amount an agent is willing to pay to replace risk" 2 with"
at initial position w 0 . By de…nition,
It is yet to …nd the restrictions on utility function for DARA in the sense of Ross to hold. Following Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), we know this is the case if there exists such that
Under our assumption of HARA, i.e., t(w) , u 0 (w)=u 00 (w) = 1 w + 1 , the utility function can be written as u (c) = c + 1 . Simple calculation shows that the above inequalities holds if
i.e., the support of the risk is not too large.
Proposition 3b
If preference exhibits DARA, risks are independent, the support of the risks are not too large;i.e., (9) holds, then
2 su¤ers from a sure reduction.
An Increase in Risk
Consider the situation whereỹ 2 is replaced byỹ 2 = w 0 +" 2 such that the RothschildStiglitz (1970) increase in risk" 2 !" 2 takes the form of adding independent noise.
For small risk with V ar(" 2 ) = 2 and V ar(" 2 ) = 2 , simple calculation yields:
Consequently, DARA is su¢ cient to ensure agent 1 bene…ts from agent 2's deterioration.
In general, C
; w 0 (10)
The inequality re ‡ects the value of risk sharing. It says the increased cost of risk associated with a deterioration in agent 2's income is smaller in the presence (11) holds.
Proof. Suppose" 2 = d"2 +~ , where" 2 and~ are independent. We prove the following two inequalities
(12) says that the increased cost of risk associated with adding an independent white noise is smaller for a more diversi…ed asset. Rewrite (12) as
where (" 2 +~ ; w 0 )
Notice that w 0 (" 2 +~ !" 2 ) is equivalent to the risk premium of~ in the presence of independent background risk" 2 while w 0
is equivalent to the risk premium of~ in the presence of independent background risk"
. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) has proved that, under decreasing absolute prudence, any SSD deterioration in background risk raises risk aversion if absolute aversion is decreasing in the sense of Ross over the relevant range of wealth. While the risk tolerance is linear, it's easy to show that the absolute prudence is decreasing. The
and therefore the …rst inequality holds because of the facts that i)"
second-order stochastically dominates " 2 ; ii) utility satis…es DARA in the sense of Ross; iii) risk tolerance is linear by assumption. The second inequality is due to DARA. The last inequality is due to (8) .
Inequality (13) can be rewritten as
; w 0 , which holds if
+ k~ ; w 0 is convex in k. Using similar method as in proof of Lemma 2, we can easily show that this is indeed the case. Combining (12) and (13) we get (11) .
Proposition 3c
If preference exhibits DARA, risks are independent, the support of the risks are not too large, i.e., (9) holds, then
2's income su¤ers from an additional independent noise
Notice that" 1 and" 2 do not have to be identically distributed for the above results to hold. The key assumption here is that" 2 is an increase in risk with respect to"
In other words, all the above predictions hold if E (" 1 " 2 j" 1 +" 2 ) 0. If this is not the case, we may have opposite prediction as shown in Example 1: a deterioration in one bargainer's position is more likely to hurt his opponent if his initial risk is su¢ ciently small (" 2 ! 0).
Application: Matching to Share Risk
Consider a risk-sharing matching game with N males fm i ; i = 1; :::; N g on one side
and N females ff j ; j = 1; :::; N g on the other side: All agents are expected utility maximizers with respect to homogeneous probabilistic belief, and have identical HARA vNM utility function u:
Agents have the opportunity to form marriages for sharing earning-risks. The timing of the matching game goes as follows:
1) Every male proposes to his most preferred female;
2) The female chooses among all the suitors her most favorable man as her Mr. Right, and turns down the others;
3) Upon getting married, the couple will commit to a rule for sharing their pooled income in each state of the world according to Nash Bargaining solution, with their threat points being consuming his/her own income;
4) The remaining males propose to the remaining females as in stage 1).
Notice that an agent's fall-back position is to consume his's own income. Hence we implicitly rule out the possibility of remarriage, which is a reasonable assumption if divorce is too costly, either physically or psychologically. Allowing for remarriage makes a di¤erent story and we leave it for future work. In both scenarios, by Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, all males prefer and hence propose to female 1, while female 1 will accept to marry to male 1. Similar logic applies to the remaining population. Consequently, we have:
The matching pattern is positive assortative: male n marries to female n. In scenario 1, rich marrying rich, poor marrying poor. In scenario 2, risky marrying risky, riskless marrying riskless.
The above prediction is consistent with empirical …ndings in household economics.
For example, marriages are sorted positively in education and wages (Becker 1973 (Becker , 1974 Lam 1988) , factors that determine the wealth and riskiness of individual income. Among the same crowed of people with the same type of job and same level of education, we see indicators that sorting is positive in wealth. Charles and Hurst (2003) have found from PSID data that parent's wealth of husband and wife are positively correlated. Understanding the matching pattern of marriage is important since it has signi…cant impact on the family's decision such as human capital investments, especially investments in descendants. (We refer to Ludo Visschers, "a note on search and assortative matching in wealth"for a discussion).
Robustness

The Rubinstein Bargaining Solution
In parallel to the axiomatic models, Rubinstein (1982) developed a strategic model of multiperiod bargaining. In this section, we will show that our result is robust under Rubinstein's alternating-o¤er bargaining game. Consider an in…nite horizon game in which two agents live for in…nite periods. They receive incomeỹ 1t ,ỹ 2t at each periods. Assume thatỹ it 1 andỹ it 2 are i.i.d., 8t 1 ; t 2 and i = 1; 2. In any period (before the realization of the risky income), one agent has the option to propose a risk sharing rule, and the other agent has the option to accept or reject it. At any period in which an o¤er is accept, the two agents commit to the risk sharing rule for all the remaining periods. After any period in which an o¤er is rejected, two agents consume their own income in that period and the game continues for another period, in which the option to make an o¤er on risk sharing rule switches to the other player.
Notice that there are two implicit assumptions in this game. First, there is no saving and therefore both agents consume all their income in each period. Second, once an agreement is reached, both agents will commit to it. This assumption can be justi…ed under the assumption of in…nite horizon, as long as the maximum realization of income is …nite and both agents are su¢ ciently patient. Indeed, the cooperative behavior can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if both agents adopt the trigger strategy, e.g., grim trigger or tit-for-tat.
Under the assumption of HARA, o¤ering risk sharing rule is equivalent to o¤ering how to share the total certainty equivalence at each state of the world. De…ne N C =
and agent 2's utility is 
the LHS is what an agent can get by agreeing immediately and the RHS is
what an agent can get by waiting.
Notice that (15), we know v 1 (a 2 ) < v 1 (a 1 ) and hence, by v 0 1 (x) > 0, we have a 1 > a 2 : agent 1 always proposes a higher share for himself than agent 2 does for agent 1.
Equation (15) gives a function a 1 = f 1 (a 2 ) and equation (14) gives a function
The last inequality is due to the facts that a 1 > a 2 )
The above analysis show that f 1 (a 2 ) crosses f 2 (a 2 ) from below. becomes more risk-averse, and v 2 (0) = e v 2 (0) = 0, then the corresponding e f 2 (a 2 ) > f 2 (a 2 ).
Proof. See appendix. From (14), we also know that
Hence, increasing N C shifts the curve a 1 = f 2 (a 2 ) upward. Now we are ready to state the comparative statics regarding a deterioration in the agent 2's income. Letỹ 2 denote agent 2's random prospect after the deterioration. As before, denote C = C C and C 
where e v 2 (x) = u C Proposition 5 says that our result is robust in the strategic bargaining game.
Under DARA, a deterioration makes agent 2 more risk averse and thus in a disadvantageous position in the noncooperative game. As a result, agent 1's share of the net certainty equivalence increases. As long as the size of the net certainty equivalent is non-decreasing under the deterioration, he will be strictly better o¤. It shows that the comparative statics prediction of the axiomatic model is preserved in the strategic model.
Positive B
In this section, we check the previously derived su¢ cient conditions which guarantee that C C 
which, by the fact that
; w 0 is convex in w 0 , is indeed decreasing in B.
For the case of perfectly correlated risk and an increase in risk, by (6), we have
; w 0 0 (See appendix for a proof), is indeed decreasing in B.
For the case of independent risk and a sure reduction, , by (7), we can see the proof that C is decreasing in B is exactly the same as in the case of perfect correlated risk and a sure reduction.
For the case of independent risk and an increase in risk, , by (5), we know that C decreasing in B is equivalent to
where" 2 =" 2 +~ , with~ independent of " i s. Using similar method as in proof of Lemma 3, we can derive that the above inequality holds if w 0
, which represents the risk premium of~ 2 in the presence of independent background risk"
; is decreasing in w 0 . By Gollier (2001), we know the property of DARA is preserved in the presence of independent background risk and hence w 0
is indeed decreasing in w 0 .
Concluding Remarks
When bargaining situation concerns risky outcomes and risky disagreement points, we
show that, under linear risk tolerance, bargaining solution can be viewed as division of a …xed amount of monetary equivalent between two risk-averse agents. That is, monetary equivalent can be losslessly transferred from one bargainer to the other bargainer. Thus whether a deterioration of a bargainer's risky prospect bene…ts his opponent depends on the net e¤ect on the total bargaining surplus. Our …ndings enrich the game-theoretic bargaining literature concerning stochastic outcomes and disagreement points, and to the best of our knowledge, are the …rst attempt to examine comparative statics regarding sure reduction and Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk. 
Since C( ) = u 1 (Eu(s( )) + u 1 (Eu(Y s( ))), which after taking derivative w.r.t.
and combining with the expression of risk tolerance yields:
Then, solving for u(s) = 1 D 1 t (s) which is equivalent to
which is independent of . We already know (19) holds for = 1, hence the above inequality must hold. Consequently (19) holds for all .
Proof of existence and uniqueness of Nash solution on S P :
Proof. We want to prove that the bargaining game S P ; d has a unique solution.
Nash (1950) One can easily check that S P de…nes an implicit function, with u 2 being a decreasing and concave function of u 1 . Indeed, (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 S P implies u 2 = u (C u 1 (u 1 )) and therefore @u 2 @u 1 = u 0 C u 1 (u 1 ) 1 u 0 (u 1 (u 1 )) < 0;
Hence, the Pareto frontier of e S is exactly S P . But we know that the Nash bargaining solution is Pareto optimal, hence it must belong to S P . By the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, the bargaining game which is equivalent to our problem P 2:
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. From (14), we have
To prove e f 2 (a 2 ) > f 2 (a 2 ), it su¢ ces to prove e v 2 (N C f 2 (a 2 )) e v 2 (N C a 2 ) > v 2 (N C f 2 (a 2 )) v 2 (N C a 2 ) .
Rearranging it gives
. From (14) , we know N C f 2 (a 2 ) < N C a 2 . Thereby, we only need to prove 
